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Nonconsensual Liens Under Article 9
The Uniform Commercial Code' does not spring forth from the
statute books a self-contained, self-sufficient body of law. The ways in
which the Code can affect or be affected by state law outside its scope
are often as important as they are subtle. Article 9 of the Code includes
as security interests only liens created by voluntary agreement.2 Non-
consensual liens are excluded expressly or by implication. Creditors
with such nonconsensual liens must inevitably come into conflict with
the world of Article 9 interests. To an extent the Code attempts to
provide for such conflicts, but its response is neither complete nor
totally clear.4
Nonconsensual Liens Under Section 9-310
States commonly grant by statute or common law a lien to artisans
to assure collection of debts owed them. For such liens the Code pro-
vides in Section 9-310 that:
When a person in the ordinary course of his business furnishes
services or materials with respect to goods subject to a security
interest, a lien upon goods in the possession of such person given
by statute or rule of law for such materials or services takes priority
over a perfected security interest unless the lien is statutory and the
statute expressly provides otherwise.
1. UNMORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1962 Official Text) [hereinafter cited as U.C.C.].
2. U.C.C. § 9-102(2):
This Article applies to security interests created by contract including pledge,
assignment, chattel mortgage, chattel trust, trust deed, factor's lien, equipment trust,
conditional sale, trust receipt, other lien or title retention contract and lease or con-
signment intended as security. This Article does not apply to statutory liens except
as provided in Section 9-310.
3. U.C.C. § 9-104:
This Article does not apply. . . (b) to a landlord's lien; or (c) to a liei given by
statute or other rule of law for services or materials except as provided in Section
9-310 on priority of such liens; or ... (h) to a right represented by a judgment.
U.C.C. § 9-102, Comment 1:
-.. Section 9-104 excludes certain transactions where the security interest (such as
an artisan's lien) arises under statute or common law by reason of status and not by
consent of the parties.
4. It is not intended that all the varied types of common law liens which may conflict
with Article 9 interests be mentioned here. Furthermore state and federal tax law or the
federal law of bankruptcy may also affect the priority rights of Article 9 interests. Such
laws, however, will not be examined directly. The state law cited or contrasted with that
of other states serves only to illustrate the type of problem that may be encountered in
applying the Code. The law in each state will obviously raise its own special problems.
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This deceptively neat provision is a mosaic of rather complex ob-
scurities.
"A lien... given by statute or rule of law for such materials or services"
When a debtor subjected encumbered property to an artisan's lien,
pre-Code law often made priority between the artisan and secured
creditor turn on whether the secured party or the debtor had title. In
this circumstance the Code intended to render location of title irrele-
vant and to grant the artisan priority unless state statutes expressly
subordinated his interest.6 Section 9-310 clearly effectuates this priority
scheme. But solution of the priority problem may not assure success for
the artisan. Under pre-Code law in some states, the secured creditor took
precedence over the artisan not because the artisan lacked "priority,"
but because the artisan had no lien. The reasoning was that when a
creditor held title, his debtor could not subject goods to an artisan's
lien.7 While Section 9-310 gives priority to an artisan's lien "given by
statute or rule of law," what, if any, is its effect on prior state law regard-
ing the existence or nonexistence of such a lien?
Under Section 9-202 "each provision of... Article [9] with regard to
rights, obligations and remedies" is to apply "whether title to collateral
5. This is the description of pre-Code law given in U.C.C. § 9-.310, Comment 2. MD.
CODE ANN. art. 21, § 54 (repealed 1963). Goldenberg v. Federal Fin. & Credit Co., 150 Md.
298, 302, 133 A. 59, 61 (1926):
the same statute which gives the lien subordinates it to the rights of persons
holding the title to it under a conditional sales contract .... (p. 150)
In General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Allen, 52 Ill. App. 2d 114, 201 N.E.2d 747 (1964),
the existence of an artisan's lien was recognized, but the opinion holds that "the I en of
the conditional vendor (titleholder) . . . is superior to that of the garage owner." Id. at
117. Adoption of the U.C.C. was held to have overruled this priority scheme. Westlake
Fin. Co. v. Spearmon, 64 II. App. 2d 342, 213 N.E.2d 80, (1965); Westlake Fin. Co. v.
Alex C. Montgomery, 64 Ill. App. 2d 347, 213 N.E.2d 34 (1965). Cf. Terrell v. Loomis,
218 Ark. 296, 301, 235 S.W.2d 961, 963 (1951).
6. U.C.C. § 9-310, Comment 2:
* , . Under chattel mortgage or conditional sales law many decisions made the
priority of such liens turn on whether the secured party did or did not have "title."
This Section changes such rules and makes the lien for services or materials prior
in all cases where they are furnished in the ordinary course of the lienor's business
and the goods involved are in the lienor's possession.
7. New Britain Real Estate & Title Co. v. Collington, 102 Conn. 652, 129 A. 780 (1925),
citing 1 L. JONEs, LAw OF LImNs § 733 (1894), "[t]o entitle one to a lien for work done
upon a chattel the work must be done at the owner's request," 102 Conn. at 655-50, 129
A. at 781. But see United States v. United Aircraft Corp., 80 F. Supp. 52 (D. Conn. 1948);
see also Bankers' Commercial Sec. Co. v. Brennan & Levy, 75 Pa. Super. 199 (1920) (bail-
ment lessor, title in bailor): "[the bailee] certainly could not have sold the truck so as to
pass the owner's title, and as a general rule there is no good reason why a party not the
owner of property should be permitted to create a lien upon it any more than he should
be permitted to sell it." Id. at 203. See also Midland Discount Co. v. Perry, 2 Cumb. 65
(Cumberland, Pa., County Ct. 1951); Guaranty Sec. Corp. v. Brophy, 243 Mass. 597, 137 NX.
751 (1923); Rehm v. Viall, 185 Ill. App. 425 (1914); Bath Motor Mart v. Miller, 122 Me. 29,
118 A. 715 (1922).
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is in the secured party or in the debtor." If controlling, this rule would
leave an artisan's rights unaffected by the location of title. But Section
9-202 governs only interests created by the Code itself; it is not deter-
minative "in cases where the applicability of some other rule of law
depends upon who has title."" Since the creation of an artisan's lien is
subject to rules of law outside the Code, Section 9-202 cannot salvage
Section 9-310 priority for an artisan who is deemed by state law to have
no lien.
Since the title holder generally has sole dominion over his property,"
it may be theoretically consistent to hold that a debtor who has con-
veyed or left title with a creditor cannot subject the property to an
artisan's encumbrance. But the Code has never made the mystique of
title and legal dominion the touchstone of substantive rights.10 Section
9-310 is designed to give an artisan a prior lien to secure claims arising
from work which enhances or preserves the value of collateral.' Because
the secured creditor as well as the debtor benefits from such work, the
artisan should be compensated before either asserts his claim to the
collateral.12 This justification for the artisan's priority exists whether
the creditor's interest in the collateral is labeled a lien or title. It would
be the height of technical legalism to assert the contrary.
Courts might avoid such legalism by reading the limitation in Section
9-310 to require only that the "services or materials" provided be the
8. U.C.C. § 9-202, Comment. In re Yale Express Sys. Inc., 250 F. Supp. 249 (S.D.N.Y.
1966). (Fruehauf Corporation perfected a security interest in equipment originally ex-
tended to Yale Express on simple credit. Two months after perfection of the security
agreement Yale filed a petition for reorganization under Chapter 10 of the Federal Bank-
ruptcy Act. Fruehauf petitioned for repossession of the equipment, claiming that the
terms of the security agreement gave it the right to repossess under the circumstances.
The district court assumed that the petition to repossess could be granted under federal
law only if the equipment was not "property of the debtor." In holding that the equip-
ment was the property of the debtor the court rejected the creditor's argument that
Section 9-202 applied to the problem at hand. The provision was held merely to give
"[t]he holder of a valid security interest all of the rights, obligations and remedies which
are provided by the Code itself." Id. at 253 (emphasis in original). The court also found
that state law distinguishing between chattel mortgages and conditional sales on the basis
of who retains title was still relevant in the context of this case and concluded that since
the parties intended only to create a chattel mortgage, title had passed under the agree-
ment to Yale and the equipment was no longer the property of Fruehauf.
9. R. BROWN, THE LAw oF PERSONAL PaoPERry § 5 (2d ed. 1955); Estey Co. v. Dick,
41 Pa. Super. 610 (1910).
10. U.C.C. § 1-102(1): "This Act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote
its underlying purposes and policies"; Id. § 9-202:
Each provision of this Article with regard to rights, obligations and remedies ap-
plies whether title to collateral is in the secured party or in the debtor.
11. U.C.C. § 9-310, Comment.
12. 2 G. GILMORE, SEcusury INTERm m PrNA.L PROPERTY § 333, at 878 (1965): "No
doubt the underlying policy justification is the thought that the lienor, through the ser-
vices or materials which he has furnished, has increased the .- lue of the propert; it
would be giving the holder of the security interest an unjustifiable windfall to allow him
to claim the property, thus improved, while the serviceman remains unpaid."
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type for which state law gives a lien. The limitation need not be read to
also incorporate state law which requires that the debtor have title in
order for a lien to arise. Courts have already demonstrated a willingness
in analogous contexts to ignore formalistic distinctions as to the loca-
tion of title. In Commonwealth v. Two Ford Trucks,"3 private encum-
brances were given priority over a state lien on trucks for highway
violations. A creditor, who held a bailment lease' 4 and was thus a
security title holder, was allowed to qualify as an encumbrancer for
purposes of the priority statute. Citing Article 9 for partial support,
the court declared that "[e]very bailment-lessor . . . is an owner for
certain purposes and an encumbrancer for certain other purposes."'"
No logical difficulty would prevent a court from accepting the same
argument and coming down with a similar result when prior state law
permits an artisan's lien only where the secured creditor is an encum-
brancer and not the title-holder.'
Even where location-of-title concepts are adhered to, courts have
validated the artisan's lien by legal fiction. For example, repairs to a car
made at the request of a conditional vendee enhance the value of the
car and inure to the benefit of the title-holder. Some courts therefore
conclude that "the conditional vendor of an automobile, when he places
it in the possession of a conditional vendee for use, impliedly consents
to the bailment of the car for reasonable repairs which enhance its
value.' 7 In addition to the fiction of implied consent, courts have used
notions of estoppel to secure the rights of an artisan to a lien after a
conditional sale when the vendor failed to file proper notice of his
interest. In such cases, with respect to the artisan the buyer is held to
13. 185 Pa. Super. 292, 137 A.2d 847 (1958).
14. The bailment lease was a major pre-Code security interest in Pennsylvania. Most
such interests would now qualify under Section 1-201 as an Article 9 interest, According
to Pennsylvania law an artisan could subject goods to a lien for work done when the
owner of the goods had requested that such work be performed, or when the owner's con-
sent could be reasonably implied from the circumstances. Because one holding goods
under a bailment lease did not possess title to the goods, he could not under state law
subject the goods to an artisan's lien. Schmidt v. Bader, 284 Pa. 41, 130 A. 259 (1925);
Blair v. Adamchick, 145 Pa. Super. 125, 21 A.2d 107 (1941).
15. Commonwealth v. Two Ford Trucks, 185 Pa. Super. 292, 801, 137 A.2d 847, 852
(1958).
16. The court would be undertaking the more difficult task of reversing prior state
law, however, and might therefore be more reluctant to follow the path suggested, In
Two Ford Trucks it merely refused to apply established title doctrines to a newly.arisen
legal question.
17. New Britain Real Estate & Title Co. v. Collington, 102 Conn. 652, 656, 129 A, 780,
781 (1925). See also Hammond v. Danielson, 126 Mass. 294 (1879); DeVan Motor Co. v.
Bailey, 177 Miss. 441, 171 So. 342 (1936). Contra, Goldstein v. Mack Motor Truck Co., 56 RJ.
1, 183 A. 156 (1936); Lee, Power of Possessor of Personal Property to Create Lien for Repairs
and Storage Charges Superior to Existing Interests of Others, 90 U. PA. L. REv. 910, 924
(1942).
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have absolute title, so that the buyer can subject his property to the
artisan's lien. As against the buyer, title remains in the seller1 s
Two conclusions are thus apparent. First, case law recognizes the
wisdom of allowing the artisan his lien, regardless of whether the
creditor or debtor had title to the property serviced. Second, the Code
itself envisions this result, but does not expressly incorporate it. In a
jurisdiction which adopts the Code, a court should reconsider any posi-
tion it has taken to the contrary. For as Comment 1 to Section 1-102
clearly states, courts "have recognized the policies embodied in an act as
applicable in reason to subject-matter which was not expressly included
in the language of the act .... They have done the same where reason
and policy so required, even where the subject-matter had been inten-
tionally excluded from the act in general."19
In addition, rejection of prior state law making a lien dependent on
title would further uniformity within and among states which let loca-
tion of title turn on the mere form in which a security transaction is
cast.20 It would eliminate the possibility that parties to the original
security agreement could arrange their transaction so as to destroy the
rights of third-party artisans.2 1 Finally, it would avoid the arbitrary
results that inevitably follow substantial reliance on such legal fictions
as implied consent.22
18. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Cirone, 146 Conn. 64, 147 A.2d 481 (1958). In
Pennsylvania the inability of the bailment-lessee to commit the goods to service liens is
also limited by the requirement that for the lessor to retain tite he or his assignor must
originally have had actual possession of the goods. Atlantic Fin. Corp. v. Kester, 156 Pa.
Super. 128, 39 A.2d 740 (1944).
19. U.C.C. § 1-102, Comment 1.
20. In Pennsylvania a secured creditor retained title if he cast his security agreement
in the form of a bailment lease, but not if he cast it as a chattel mortgage or conditional
sale. The ability of the debtor to subject his property to an artisan's lien thus varied with
the form rather than the substance of the secunty transaction. See Duplex Printing Press
Co. v. Clipper Pub. Co., 213 Pa. 207, 62 A. 841 (1906); Schmidt v. Bader, 284 Pa. 41, 130 A.
259 (1925); Law of May 12, 1925, Pa. P.L. 603, No. 325, [1915] (repealed 1953); Law of
June 1, 1945, Pa. P.L. 1043, §§ 1-17, [1945] (repealed 1953).
The debtor's ability to subject his property to an artisan's lien varied from state to state
as well as within a state. In Connecticut, for example, title remained with the creditor in
all cases, whereas in Pennsylvania it always passed to the debtor (except in a bailment
transaction). CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. tit. 49, § 95 [1960] (repealed 1961); CoxN. Gasv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 42, § 77 [1960] (repealed 1961); Baker v. Brown & Thomas Auto Co., 101 Conn.
575, 126 A. 703 (1924) (agreement of sale); New Britain Real Estate & Title Co. V. Coiling-
ton, 102 Conn. 652, 129 A. 780 (1952) (conditional sale); Guilford-Chester Water Co. v.
Guilford, 107 Conn. 519, 141 A. 880 (1928) (chattel mortgage).
21. The parties to the original agreement could secure such a result by selecting a type
of security agreement by which the creditor would for this purpose be held to have re-
tamined title. The parties could also expressly stipulate that the creditor is not to be
viewed as giving his implied consent to the creation of artisan's Hens for services or
materials performed on the goods. The agreement could also state that the goods are
to be kept free of all liens. See Goldenberg v. Federal Fin. & Credit Co., 50 Md. 298,
133 A. 59 (1926).
22. Compare Funchess v. Pennington, 205 Miss. 500, 39 So. 2d 1 (1949) with Wingate v.
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"When a person in the ordinary course of his business furnishes services
or materials with respect to goods"
By narrowing its application to services on materials furnished in the
ordinary course of business, the Code has exposed Section 9-310 to a
potential avalanche of evidentiary trivia. If this language is taken liter-
ally, a serviceman or materialman would have to prove that the trans-
action giving rise to his lien was similar in nature and scope to his ordi-
nary transactions before he could receive priority. Clearly, however, the
Code did not intend courts to establish boundaries for the business of
every lienor that comes before them. As long as a lienor performs ser-
vices or furnishes materials which enhance the value of goods, he should
be granted priority if there is some minimal similarity between his gen-
eral business and the specific transaction for which he claims a lien. This
would focus attention on whether the lienor has added services or ma-
terials to goods: the fact which justifies his priority. Presumably where
the artisan grossly overcharges for the work he claims to have done, the
overcharge does not relate to an enhancement of the goods' value. It
would accordingly not be in the ordinary course of business.23
Determining exactly what constitutes "services or materials" may also
raise difficulties. Some commentators argue that a landlord provides
services by making available a place to preserve a tenant's goods and
that a lien attaching to such goods therefore comes within Section
9-310.24 Section 9-104, however, declares that Article 9 generally does
not apply ".... (b) to a landlord's lien; or (c) to a lien given by statute
or other rule of law for services or materials except as provided in
Section 9-310 on priority of such liens . . . ." The Article thus appears
to differentiate a landlord's lien from a lien for services or materials,
and gives priority only to the latter.
The Comment to Section 9-104(b) suggests that the drafters excluded
landlord liens from Article 9 only to make explicit the Code's intent
Mississippi Securities, 152 Miss. 852, 120 So. 175 (1929); DeVan Motor Co. v. Bailey, 177
Miss. 441, 171 So. 342 (1936).
23. In discussing this phrase Gilmore suggests that the "limitation should be read as
tantamount to a requirement of good faith." 2 G. GILMOrE, SEcURvT INTERESTS IN Pmr.
SONAL PROPERTY § 33.5, at 888 (1965). Viewed in this light the phrase is simply a require.
ment that the amount of the repairs and the price charged be reasonable under all the cir.
cumstances. This interpretation would avoid the difficulty of determining the exact nature
of the artisan's usual business. One difficulty with this reading is the Code's definition of
a '!'[b]uyer in ordinary course of business"' as "a person who buys in ordinary course
from a person-in the business of selling goods of that kind .... U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (em.
phasis added). This suggests that "in the ordinary course of business" is a term denoting
-normal repeated business operations.
. 24, Pa. Bar Ass'n Note.5, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-310 (1954); Schwartz, Pennsyl-
vania's Chattel Security and the Uniform Commercial Code, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 510, 541
(1950).
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not to regulate interests in real property. 6- To the extent that a land-
lord's lien falls upon a tenant's crops, mineral ore or other real property,
exclusion of the lien is consistent with this intention. But when a land-
lord's lien falls upon personal property, such as a tenant's automobile,
exclusion of the lien from Article 9 would not be so justified.
Even if Section 9-104(b) did not exclude a landlord's lien on personal
property from Article 9, such a lien may still be outside Section 9-310
because it is not for "services or materials furnished with respect to
goods."26 The court in In re Einhorn Brothers,- for example, refused
to grant a landlord's lien priority under Section 9-310, on the grounds
that the act of leasing was not "work that enhances or preserves the
value of the collateral" and so not within the intended scope of the
section3 s This conclusion may have been based on a captious distinc-
tion between benefit to the tenant and benefit to the collateral goods.
Since a lease may provide the tenant with both a place to work and a
place to manufacture, store or merchandise his goods, such a distinction
would compel a court either to wander aimlessly trying to apportion
benefits or to decide arbitrarily whether it was the seized goods
that primarily benefited from a lease.
If Section 9-310 is interpreted to exclude landlord, innkeeper and
other such liens, the interpretation has ambiguous implications. Section
9-310 may intend by the exclusion to subordinate all landlord liens,
or such liens may simply be outside its scope and subject to pre-existing
state law. In re Einhorn Brothers rejected the argument that exclusion
had the effect of subordinating landlord liens to Article 9 interests, and
held instead that relevant law "was undisturbed by enactment of the
Code." 29 This is reasonable, for were Section 9-310 intended to subordi-
nate all liens not given priority it is unlikely that such a potentially
wholesale change in state law would have been left to inference alone.
25. U.C.C. § 9-104, Comment 2: "Except for fixtures (Section 9-313), the Article applies
only to security interests in personal property. The exclusion of landlord's liens by para-
graph (b) and of leases and other interests in or liens on real estate by paragraph 0")
merely reiterates the limitations on coverage already made explicit in Section 9-102(3)."
26. Emphasis added.
27. 171 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Pa.), aft'd, 272 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1959); see also Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Dutton, 205 Pa. Super. 4, 205 A.2d 656 (1965) (residential lease;
Einhorn followed without discussion).
28. 171 F. Supp. at 660.
29. Id. The fact that former state law applies rather than Section 9-310 is of little
practical significance in Pennsylvania since under state law the landlord generally is
given priority over prior secured liens. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 322 (196). The right
of a landlord to priority is not changed by the landlord's knowledge that the goods are
not owned by the tenant or by the removal of the goods without the consent of the seller.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Dutton, 205 Pa. Super. 4,205 A.2d 656 (1964) (dictum).
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"A lien upon goods in the posession of [the lienor]"
The requirement that a lien be possessory before it is accorded
priority first appeared without explanation in the Code's 1956 draft.0
One possible reason for the addition was the 1952 amendment to Sec-
tion 67(c) of the Bankruptcy Act."' The amendment invalidated as
against the bankruptcy trustee nonpossessory statutory liens on per-
sonalty. Such liens could, for the benefit of unsecured creditors, be
transferred to the bankruptcy trustee who was then entitled to any
priority attaching to the lien.32 Thus, in 1956, preference to an artisan's
nonpossessory lien under Section 9-310 might have sacrificed the
secured creditor's interest not to the artisan whom Section 9-3 10 seeks to
protect but to unsecured creditors in bankruptcy. If a desire to avoid
such a sacrifice motivated the drafters of section 9-310, however, the
requirement no longer makes good sense. The Bankruptcy Act as of
1966 validates nonpossessory liens except where they are unenforceable
against a bona fide purchaser or where they are effective only when the
debtor is financially distressed. 83
Possession by the artisan may still serve a useful purpose: it can put
secured creditors on notice as to the artisan's interest. 4 Actual posses-
sion, however, is not always necessary to fulfill this notice function. The
filing required under some artisan's lien statutes, for instance, may well
give as much notice as continued possession; a court might well accept
an adequate filing system as constituting constructive possession.35
30. 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 23.5, at n.4 (1965).
31. Law of July 7, 1952, ch. 579, § 21(d), 66 Stat. 427 (repealed 1966).
32. 11 U.S.C.A. § 107(c)(2) (Supp. 1966): "The court may, on due notice, order any of
the aforesaid liens invalidated against the trustee to be preserved for the benefit of the
estate and in that event the lien shall pass to the trustee."
33. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 107(c) (Supp. 1966):
(1) The following liens shall be invalid against the trustee:(A) every statutory lien which first becomes effective upon the insolvency of the
debtor, or upon distribution or liquidation of his property, or upon execution
against -his property levied at the instance of one other than the lienor;(B) every statutory lien which is not perfected or enforceable at the date of bank-
ruptcy against one acquiring of a bona fide purchaser from the debtor on that date,
whether or not such purchaser exists ....
The Act includes a secured creditor as a bona fide purchaser, II U.S.C. § 1(5) (1964).
34. Possession by an artisan may put third parties on notice as to the artisan's liens
and preclude them from successfully claiming as bona fide purchasers under the Bank-
ruptcy Act. F. Kennedy, The Bankruptcy Amendments of 1966, 1 GA. L. RV. 149, 156.57(1967). The Act thus shifts emphasis from possession per se, to possession as a consideration
effecting notice.
As to possession as a means of notice, see also Coggin v. California Div. of Labor Law
Enforcement, 336 U.S. 118, 127-29 (1949); City of New York v. Hall, 139 F.2d 935, 936 (2d
Cir. 1944); Pond v. Skidmore, 40 Conn. 210, 222 (1873). The liens in question were attach.
ment liens. See also Note, Statutory Liens Under Section 67(c) of the Bankruptcy Act, 62
YALE L.J. 1131 (1953).
35. In this way the debtor would have the use of goods which could be essential to
his ability to earn suffident funds to pay off his creditors.
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Filing may even furnish more effective notice than possession. Land-
lord liens, for example, are created when the landlord enters the
premises, distrains the goods by viewing them, and notifies all known
owners. The goods remain on the leased premises and are still subject
to the tenant's use. Only their destruction or removal is prohibited. 0
For the unknown creditor, such "distraint" or possession provides no
notice whatsoever.
But filing may also be less effective than possession. Some statutes
permit an artisan to surrender possession while not requiring immedi-
ate filing;37 notice will date from the time of surrender though filing
may be delayed for months, 8 Such defects are not inherent in a system
56. Mountcastle v. Schumann, 205 Pa. Super. 21, 205 A.2d 642 (194); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 68, § 250.302 (1965) ("Notice in writing of such distress ... shall be given ... to the
tenant and any other owner known to the landlord, personally, or by mailing the same
... or by posting the same conspicuously on the premises charged with the rent'). Before
the goods are sold at auction, public notice need only be given by means of handbills
issued at least six days before the sale. Id. at § 250.309. A secured creditor could therefore
never learn of the lien in time to prevent such an auction.
The prior secured creditor in Pennsylvania is not completely at ie mercy of landlord
liens, however. The law makes an exception to the general rule that a landlord is entitled
to preference in the case of a tenant who holds certain specifically enumerated items
under a conditional sale or bailment lease arrangement. These items include industrial
mining and construction machinery and equipment not attached to the realty. See id. at
§§ 250.401, 250.402, 250.404. In such an event the vendor or lessor may preserve his prior-
ity if he gives notice to the landlord of his security interest within ten days after the
goods are placed on the landlord's premises or if he places his name in a prominent place
on the goods. Case law has held that similar rights do not extend to one holding a chattel
mortgage interest in the same goods. Commercial Credit Plan v. Mahoney, 67 Pa. D. & C.
577 (1948); Herman v. Osgood, 103 P.L.J. 231 (1956). To reach this holding the leading
case relies in part on the conclusion that since the Chattel Mortgage Act "is a departure
from the heretofore settled public policy of the State we cannot extend its provisions
farther than was clearly intended by our legislature." 67 Pa. D. & C. at 579.
This pre-Code holding would seem a questionable one now in view of the Code's full
acceptance of the chattel mortgage and its general policy of treating all security interests
alike. Nevertheless, the statutory distinction may remain part of the Pennsylvania prior-
ity law.
The juxtaposition of the U.C.C. to statutes as this raises possible procedural problems
as well. It is not certain whether the notice requirement imposed upon the secured credi-
tor by the landlord statute is satisfied by simply meeting the notice requirements estab-
lished by the Code for the protection of any security interest. Two different notice
procedures may have to be followed because 1) the statute subordinating the landlord's
lien in such circumstances seems to contemplate actual notice, while filing under Article 9
may only give constructive notice, and 2) the statute seems to require information in the
notice that need not necessarily be included in the financing statement under the Code.
37. Immediate filing is not compelled because it is expected that the artisan vill
ordinarily collect for his work without asserting a lien. Filing, in these cases, would simply
needlessly dog the record system. Such delayed filing does not, and was probably never
intended to, provide fair and adequate notice. Filing, when it does occur, is designed
primarily to evidence the artisan's claim, and to put pressure on the debtor to pay.
88. Ky. RE:v. STAT. ch. 376.440(1) (1963). Statutes providing for filing in place of con-
tinued possession may raise further problems for secured creditors if the location for filing
prescribed by the law is not easily ascertainable. The Kentucky statute largely obviates this
problem by specifying that the artisan shall file in the county of the debtor's residence.
Id. at chs. 376.440(1), 376.445. However, the county of residence of a statewide company
may not always be clear. Furthermore, if the debtor is not a resident of the state the
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substituting filing for actual possession, however. They could be
avoided if the state adopted a scheme analogous to that used by the
Code for purchase money security interests in inventories. 0 Notice
would then automatically be sent to prior encumbrancers and the lien
would be recorded, so subsequent creditors would have as much notice
as they have of any other lien.40
The most difficult liens to reconcile with the possessory wording in
Section 9-310 are those in which the lienholder has never had actual
possession of the goods. While states may allow for artisan's liens under
such circumstances, 41 the mechanic's lien 42 is more typical of this type.
Though not generally classed as interests in personal property, me-
chanic's liens still compete with Article 9 security interests. Fixtures
remain subject to an Article 9 interest unless the goods become "incor-
porated into a structure in the manner of lumber, bricks ... and the
like. ' 43 Even structural affixations like brickwork may remain subject to
artisan must file in the county where the goods are located. Secured creditors may not
know the location of the goods at the time the artisan filed.
Originally the potential threat to the interests of secured creditors was limited by a
provision that established a first in time, first in right priority scheme. Id. at ch. 376.450.
However, if Section 9-310 were held controlling, the exception for contrary state law
would not operate to incorporate the former state priority statute. Case law has held
that because the statute refers to mortgages while the Code recognizes "security interests"
only, the statute is no longer applicable. Corbin Deposit Bank v. King, 884 S.W2d 802
(Ky. Ct. App. 1964).
39. U.C.C. § 9-107:
A security interest is a "purchase money security interest" to the extent that it is
(a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part of Its price:
or
(b) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an obligation gives
value to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of collateral if such value
is in fact so used.
Id. at § 9-312(3):
(3) A purchase money security interest in inventory collateral has priority over a
conflicting security interest in the same collateral if...
(a) at the time the debtor receives possession;
(b) any secured party whose security interest is known to the holder of the pur-
chase money security interest or who, prior to the date of the filing made by
the holder of the purchase money security interest, had filed a financing state-
ment covering the same items or type of inventory, has received notification of
the purchase money security interest before the debtor receives possession of the
collateral covered by the purchase money security interest.
40. Of course, no system can feasibly furnish notice to unknown creditors.
41. E.g., Ky. RFv. STAT. ch. 376.440(2) (1963) provides that:
The [artisan's] lien provided for in this section shall attach regardless of whether
or not the equipment, machine, machinery, motor, or motors, are ever upon the
premises of or in the possession of the person making the repairs, furnishing the
parts, or the supplies for such repairs.
42. "A mechanic's lien is a lien on land, and on the fixtures and improvements
thereon, created by statute, to secure the compensation of persons who, under contract
with the owner, or some person authorized in his behalf, contrtibute labor or material
to the improvement of the land." H. TIFFANY, A TaRnATsa ON THE MODEM LAW or REAL
PROPERTY § 962 (C. Zollman ed. 1940).
43. U.C.C. § 9-313(1).
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Article 9 interests in a state which treats such fixtures as personalty.44 A
mechanic's lien may also attach to the same goods.4
Originally the assumption was that Section 9-310 would govern the
priority of mechanic's liens vis-h-vis consensual security interests. Profes-
sor Gilmore, one of the early drafters of the Code, wrote that Section
9-310 will "provide a uniform workable rule to determine relative
priority in all cases as between artisan's, mechanic's and other similar
liens and the holder of contractual security interests. 40 However, after
Section 9-310 was reworded to include the troublesome phrase "goods
in the possession of such person," commentators began to treat me-
chanic's liens as outside the scope of the section and governed by prior
state law.47
The reason behind the exclusion is unclear. The Bankruptcy Act
never invalidated statutory liens on real estate fixtures per se, so the
justification advanced for excluding nonpossessory liens on personalty
is not applicable here.48 Nor does inadequate notice pose as significant
a problem as it does with personalty. To perfect a mechanic's lien in
Pennsylvania, for example, a claim must be filed within four months
of the completion of work and written notice served on owners within
one month after filing.49 The place of filing is the county in which the
fixture is located.50 Although the problem of a notice-date preceding
actual filing still exists, by periodically examining the collateral and the
land records of this one county creditors can keep themselves at least
ultimately informed. They are never misled by the fact that a mechanic
does not have possession of goods subject to his lien, since it is seldom
feasible to give a mechanic possession of goods physically attached to the
debtor's realty. They are alerted by Section 9-313 to the potential
relevance of real property interests and of the need to check the land
records for rival claims.
If, on a constructive possession theory, Section 9-310 is held to in-
44. Id.
45. Under Connecticut law, for example, a heating furnace is subject to a mechanic's
lien unless otherwise specified by the parties. Hardin v. Cody, 144 Conn. 499, 134 A.2d
245, (1957). Section 9-313(I) assures the continued validity of a security interest in the
furnace as well.
46. G. Gur.RoR, 4 CoN'aRNc ON PEJIsONAL FNAcE LAw QuAMRTLY REonr 13 (No.
3, 1950).
47. 1 P. COOGAN, IV. HOGAN & D. VACTs, SEcuRED TRANsAscroNs UNDER TrIe UNIFOrMJ
CosssMRCeIAL CODE § 5.07(1)[b] (1966).
48. 11 U.S.C. § 107(b), (c), as amended, 11 U.S.C.A. § 107(b), (c) (Supp. 1966).
49. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 49, § 1502 (1965). In addition a subcontractor must give the owner
actual notice thirty days before filing every claim, and if the claim is for alteration and
repairs he must further have given preliminary notice to the owner of intent to file a
claim on or before the date of completion of work. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 49, § 1501 (1965).
50. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 49, § 1502(b) (1965).
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lude mechanic's liens and to accord them priority over Article 9 inter-
ests, a circular priority could result whenever Section 9-313 prefers an
Article 9 interest over a real interest. Commonly a state will prefer real
property interests over a mechanic's lien.51 If it does, then the real prop-
erty interest is superior to the mechanic's lien, which is superior to the
Article 9 interest, which is superior to the real property interest. The
existence of such an obvious circularity may evidence the Code's inten-
tion not to include a mechanic's lien as a Section 9-310 "possessory"
interest.
Section 9-313, which controls priorities between Article 9 interests
and "the claims of all persons who have an interest in the real estate,"
may also regulate mechanics' liens. 2 Under this provision, circular
priority is still possible. A perfected post-affixation security interest
would take preference over a subsequent mechanic's lien but not over
a prior judgment lien on the realty.53 In New York, on the other hand,
the mechanic's lien would have preference over any prior judgment
lien which did not represent a claim for money spent on improve-
ments.54 Circularity may result, for the mechanic's lien may be superior
to the judgment lien, which is superior to the security interest, which
is superior to the mechanic's lien.
Circular priorities cannot be resolved by any general reliance on the
commercial policy implicit in Sections 9-310 and 9-313 that interests
enhancing the value of the security should be protected even at the
expense of prior interests, for more than one of the competing interests
will invariably have contributed to the value of the collateral." Cobl-
skill Savings & Loan Association v. Rickard" applied an assumption-of-
risk rationale to break the chain of circularity among a mechanic's lien,
51. In Connecticut, for example, the lien is given subordinate to other encumbrances
originating before the commencement of such services or furnishing of such materials.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. tit. 49, § 33 (1958). The mechanic's lien is not defeated by other en-
cumbrances filed while work is in progress, nor by a prior real estate mortgage, whether
a purchase money mortgage or not, filed after work has begun. Gruss v. Miskinis, 130
Conn. 367, 34 A.2d 600 (1943). Pennsylvania law is similar. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 49, § 1508(1965). Citizens Bank of Palmerton v. Lesko, 277 Pa. 174, 120 A. 808 (1923). See also 57
C.J.S. Mechanic's Liens § 200 (1948).
52. U.C.C. § 9-313(2)-(5). Since Section 9-313 contains no exception for contrary state
priority law, the Section would clearly effect a more far-reaching modification of state law
than Section 9-310. Moreover, the modification would reverse the priority established
under Section 9-310. For a mechanic's lien would be subordinated to all Article 9 interests
except those perfected by the Article 9 security holder after the goods had become
affixed to the realty and a mechanic's lien had arisen.
53. U.C.C. § 9-313(3): "A security interest which attaches to goods after they become
fixtures is valid against all persons subsequently acquiring interests in the real estate
except as stated in subsection (4) but is invalid against any person with an interest In the
real estate at the time the security interest attaches to the goods ......
54. N.Y. LIEN LAw § 13 (McKinney 1966).
55. See p. 1651 supra.
56. 15 App. Div. 2d 286, 223 N.Y.S.2d 246 (1962).
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a real property mortgage (securing a building loan) and judgment liens.
The court ruled that the mortgage lender knew or should have known
of the danger that circularity might develop, and subordinated his
claim to the claims of the mechanic's lienor and the judgment credi-
tors.57 If it is commercially reasonable to presume that mortgagees
before extending a loan will examine land records and realize that
circularity is possible, whereas mechanics will not do so before furnish-
ing services or materials, 8 the Cobleskill solution is about as good as
any that could be devised.
Courts could, however, reject an all-or-nothing approach and appor-
tion collateral pro rata among liens in cases of circular priority.
Adopted by the Code in the case of accessions"O and commingled assets,ce
the principle of apportionment has both a familiar and strong appeal to
equity.
"Unless the lien is statutory and the statute expressly provides
otherwise"
An artisan has priority under Section 9-310 "unless his lien is statu-
tory and the statute expressly provides otherwise."0 ' It is not immedi-
57. "Appellant knew or should have known that these judgments would have priority
over its claim in a foreclosure proceeding, and since the money advanced was for building
purposes it should also have been aware of the possibility that a mechanic's lien could be
filed.... Appellant should have envisioned the instant problem and in fact could have
eliminated it. and at the same time protected the mechanic's lienor, by compelling the
Rikards to satisfy the prior judgments before it made the loan to them." Id. at 28S, 223
N.Y.S.2d at 248.
58. The size of the original loan was $8,000 while the size of the mechanic's lien held
entitled to priority was only $944.88. In such circumstances it is reasonable to expect a
higher degree of care from the commercial lender than from the contractor. Further-
more, when a loan is made by a commercial lender he reviews as a matter of course the
state of the security offered. A building contractor who agrees to do work on a property
contemplates payment upon completion of work and does not necessarily contemplate at
that time the possible need of a lien to insure payment. He is thus less likely to check the
owner's security before agreeing to do work for him.
59. Section 9-314.
60. Section 9-315.
61. The contrary state law can be other provisions of the Code itself. Section 7-209(3)
provides, inter alia, that a warehouseman's Hen for charges and expenses is effective
against others than the bailor when such other person "so entrusted the bailor with
possession of the goods that a pledge of them by him to a good faith purchaser for value
would have been valid." This provision is similar to Section 28 of the Uniform Warehouse
Receipts Act, which provision was regularly interpreted to mean that the uarehouseman's
lien was not good as against a prior perfected security interest. 2 G. G mroRE, SEcunr'
INRmr-rs IN PERSONAL PROParY § 33.6 (1965).
The Code's treatment of carrier's liens in Section 7-307 may also produce different
results than under Section 9-310, for unlike Section 9-310 the provision in Article 7 states
specifically who may subject goods to the lien. A carrier required by law to carry the
goods receives priority unless he has notice that the consignor lacked all authority. If the
carrier is obligated only by contract his lien has priority only so long as the consignor
was actually permitted to have possession of the goods. Unlike the law in the first in-
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ately apparent why the Code insists that not only the order of priority,
but also the lien itself, be established by statute. Gilmore suggests that
the drafters included this whole exception for contrary statutory law to
avoid the confusion which would have resulted if all prior statutes
regulating priorities had been repealed by implication. 2 The exception
was felt appropriate only where a state had consciously adopted a
priority system different from that employed under Section 9-310. But
an explicit decision of the state legislature to subordinate an artisan's
lien would be adequately indicated by a statute specifically establishing
the subordinate priority whether the lien itself was a creature of
common or statute law.
The requirement that a lien be created as well as subordinated by
statute would thus seem superfluous; it can only frustrate the unwary
legislature. In Ohio, for example, on the same day the Code was enacted
the legislature subordinated all automobile liens to certain prior
recorded interests." Yet this clear expression of legislative intention
was not sufficient to overcome Section 9-310's grant of priority for an
artisan's lien, because the lien was created by common law. Only by
construing automobile interests as being outside of Article 9 regulation
was an Ohio court able to uphold the legislative intention.0 4 This con-
stance, no lien arises if the consignor is a thief. As in the case of warehousemen's liens,
therefore, Section 9-310 may not be the provision in the Code that is controlling.
It should also be noted that even if a contrary state lien statute expressly provides for
preference of the prior security interest, subordination of the subsequent artisan's lien is
not inevitable. State law may still provide for subordination of the prior secured claim
through waiver. There is no reason to think that Section 9-810 invalidates such waivers.
Section 9-316 specifically establishes the rights of creditors to subordinate their rights.
A recent Alaska case held that the prior security holder had not waived his rights, but by
implication the court suggested that even in a Code state with express statutes subordi-
nating the artisan's lien, waiver of the prior rights is still possible. However, the waiver
could not be by implication. Decker v. Aurora Motors, Inc., 409 P.2d 603 (Alaska 1966).
62. 2 G. GILIsORE, SEcuRrrY INTERS IN PESONAL. PROPERTY § 33.5 (1965).
68. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. ch. 4505.18 (1965): "Any security agreement covering a security
interest in a motor vehicle, if such instrument is accompanied by delivery of a manu-
facturer's or importer's certificate ... shall be valid as against ... subsequent purchasers,
secured parties, and other lien holders or claimants."
See also 2 U.C.C. REP. SEav. 750 (1966).
64. Commonwealth Loan Co. v. Berry, 2 Ohio St. 2d 169, 81 Ohio Op. 2d 821, 207
N.E.2d 545 (1965). The opinion relies in part on the fact that the Ohio legislature
exercised, with respect to cars, the option given a state under Section 9-302(c)(2) to
establish a different control filing system than that provided by the Code. The court
implies that by so doing the legislature excluded security interests in cars from the control
of Article 9 and therefore of Section 9-810. Section 9-302 is not meant, however, to
encourage indirect amendment of the priority scheme established by the Code. While the
legislature may well have intended the result reached in this case, courts should insist
that before they will give such wide scope to the legislative enactment the Code must be
altered to state specifically any intended amendment. See Westlake Fin. Co. v. Spearmon,
64 Ill. App. 2d 842, 846, 218 N.E.2d 80, 82-83 (1965).
In a lower Ohio court the problem in the case was resolved by what seems a clear
misreading of the Section. The court interpreted the requirement that "the lien be
statutory" to go to the nature of the voluntary security interest rather than to the non-
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struction may not be possible in other states. But if confronted with a
statute which expressly subordinates a common law artisan's lien, a
court could always hold that the statute "ratifies" the lien, so that the
lien is statutory within the meaning of Section 9-310.
Another problem lurks in the clause "unless the lien is statutory and
the statute expressly provides otherwise." 65 When read literally, these
words seem to permit only the statute which creates a lien to subordi-
nate it. But it is often fortuitous that a statute which establishes a lien
also continues to regulate its priority.0 Legislatures frequently repeal
scattered individual priority statutes for existing liens, and enact a
comprehensive priority provision for all. Similarly a legislature may
modify existing priorities by a provision in a statute creating a new
lien. No substantive decision is thus implied by the fact that a priority
provision appears elsewhere than in the statute creating the lien. This
meaningless fact should not be determinative of whether Section 9-310's
"unless" clause applies. The Code need not be interpreted so nar-
rowly.67
Judicial Liens
Under the Code, a judicial lien acquired by a creditor who has
knowledge of a prior security interest in the same property is subordi-
nate to that interest. A judicial lien acquired by a creditor without such
knowledge has priority over a security interest which is perfected after
voluntary lien. Commonwealth Loan Co. v. Downtown Lincoln Mercury Co., 4 Ohio App.
2d 24, 33 Ohio Op. 2d 6, 211 N.E.2d 57 (1964). This would reduce the whole exception in
Section 9-310 to an exercise in futility in most cases since the statute governing such
security interests is Article 9, including, of course, Section 9-310. The court avoids this,
however, by citing as the relevant statute section 4505.13, the Ohio motor vehicle statute.
On appeal the supreme court at least brought some order to the problem by first
expressly stating that "IMhe lien referred to in Section 1309.29, Revised Code, is the
artisan's lien." Commonwealth Loan Co. v. Berry, 2 Ohio St. 2d 169, 170, 31 Ohio Op.
2d 321, 207 N.E.2d 545,546 (1965).
65. Emphasis added.
66. In Massachusetts, for example, a garage keeper is given by statute a Hen for the
storage and care of automobiles. MAss. ANN. LA v ch. 255, § 25 (1956). Also by statute liens
of all bailees are specifically subordinated to a prior conditional vendor or lessor if the
artisan receives the goods subsequent to the breach of any condition of the security agree-
ment and the secured creditor claims his property from the artisan within 90 da)i. MAsS.
ANN. L&NWs ch. 255, § 35 (1956). While the two provisions are codified under the same
chapter entitled "Miscellaneous Liens," they were passed at different times as parts of
different bills and have not subsequently been combined into one statute by legislative
action.
The provision's reference to conditional vendors or lessors will only raise additional
problems since the Code now recognizes only security interests. Sec note 36 supra.
67. An Ohio court briefly raised the problem but the question was unrelated to the
case and no solution was suggested. Commonwealth Loan Co. v. Downtown Lincoln
Mercury Co., 4 Ohio App. 2d 24,33 Ohio Op. 2d 6,211 N.E.2d 57 (1964).
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the lien attaches,68 but is subordinate to a security interest which per.
fects before.69
Time of Perfection for the Security Interest
While this priority scheme often makes the time of perfection critical,
the time of perfection is not always easily ascertainable under ihe Code.
For example, a secured creditor cannot perfect his interest before he
gives value70 and he does not give value by merely promising to make
voluntary, optional future advances. 71 A secured creditor who agrees to
make voluntary future advances has thus only an incomplete interest
until he makes the first advance. The Code is unclear as to whether the
giving of value under the first advance is sufficient to perfect every
voluntary advance made under the agreement or just the initial one. 2
If only the initial advance is perfected, then a judicial lien attaching
after that advance would have priority over every advance subsequent
to the lien.73 If all advances are perfected from the time of the first,
then the judicial lien has preference over none.
68. A lien creditor is a creditor who has acquired his interest by attachment, levy or
the like. Section 9-301 provides that an "unperfected security interest is subordinate to
the rights of . . . (b) a person who becomes a lien creditor without knowledge of the
security interest and before it is perfected." By implication, a lien creditor who has
knowledge of a prior unperfected security interest is subordinate to it.
Section 9-313 also provides that a security interest, whether attaching before or after
the collateral has become affixed to real property, is subordinate to a judgment lien
acquired before the security interest is perfected if the lien is obtained without knowledge
of the secured party's rights. If a security interest attaches after goods become a fixture,
the interest is in addition subordinated to any existing judgment lien on the real estate.
69. Since the drafters of the Code regulated priorities between unperfected security
interests and judgment liens, reason suggests they, would also regulate priorities between
perfected interests and judgment liens. Further, if the provisions subordinating Article 9
interests to such lien creditors only refer to unperfected interests, then the clear intent,
if not the assumption of the drafters, was that perfected security interests would not be
subordinated to subsequent judgment liens. Nowhere does the Code specifically so state,
however. At best it can only be said to be implied.
70. U.C.C. § 9-204: "A security interest cannot attach until there is agreement (sub-
section (3) of Section 1-201) that it attach and value is given and the debtor has rights
in the collateral. It attaches as soon as all of the events in the preceding sentence have
taken place unless explicit agreement postpones the time of attaching."
U.C.C. § 9-303: "A security interest is perfected when it has attached and when all of
the applicable steps required for perfection have been taken."
71. Section 1-201(44)(a) states that "a binding commitment to extend credit" con-
stitutes value, thereby suggesting that a commitment does not constitute value If not
binding.
72. 2 G. GILoRE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 35.6, at 934 (1965);
Coogan & Gordon, The Effect of the Uniform Commercial Code Upon Receivables
Financing-Some Answers and Some Unresolved Problems, 76 HARv. L. Rxv. 1529, 151-66(1963); Coogan, Intangibles as Collateral Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 77 HARV.
L. REv. 997, 1028 (1964); see also Coogan, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code:
Priorities among Secured Creditors and the "Floating Lien," 72 Hsv. L. REv. 838, 867(1959) (conflicting security interests).
73. Provided the judicial lienor had no knowledge of the security agreement.
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Under the common law each advance was deemed a separate security
interest whencactually made.74 There is, perhaps, rough justice in so
favoring a judgment creditor over one who makes voluntary advances.
A judgment creditor attaches property presumably because it is the only
way to assure satisfaction of an outstanding debt. Such a creditor is
almost -inevitaply damaged if his levy is upset by another creditor
making.,subsequent advances. In contrast, the prior security interest
holder-can avoid any damage to his interests by simply ceasing to make
further: advances upon notice of the judgment lien. This consideration
in most cases should outweigh any argument the secured creditor can
make that his advances added to the value of the estate and that he is
therefore entitled to priority.75
In some states reliance on this common law solution would contradict
a clear legislative policy. In Pennsylvania, for example, the pre-
Code chattel mortgage statute provided specifically that voluntary
future advances "shall be secured to the same extent and shall have
the same priority as if made at the time of the execution of the
mortgage." 76 The statute reflects the view that it is often unclear
whether a future advance is mandatory or voluntary, and that creditors
should not be compelled to choose between making an advance which
might be subordinated to a judicial lien, or not making an advance
which might be legally mandatory. Secured creditors are thus spared a
painful judicial risk, and future-advances financing is encouraged. In
states like Pennsylvania the Code should probably be interpreted in the
light of the legislation which preceded it rather than the common law.
But such an interpretive technique has its disadvantages.
Time of Attachment for Judicial Liens
The time a judicial lien attaches is usually made clear by state law;
the lien can date from as early as the initiation of suit.7 The danger to
the secured creditor lies therefore not in his inability to ascertain when
judicial liens attach, but in the fact that such liens may attach before it
is legally possible for him to perfect his security interest.
74. Farmers Nat'l Bank of Pennsburg v. Kern, 194 Pa. Super. 479, 168 A.2d 620 (1961);
McLane v. Roman, 52 Pa. 458 (1866).
75. Even if no value is considered to have been given. the voluntary future advances
agreement can still qualify as an unperfected security interest. The rights of a creditor
who obtains a judicial lien with knowledge of that interest are subordinate to the security
agreement.
76. No. 434, § 4, [1945] Pa. P.L. 1358 (repealed 1953).
77. Peoples Savings Bank v. Corrado, 151 Conn. 388, 390, 198 A.2d 209, 210 (1964);
Joseph v. Donovan, 116 Conn. 160, 164, 164 A. 498, 499 (1933).
1665
The Yale Law Journal
Consider a security agreement which provides that goods in which
the debtor subsequently attains rights shall be subject to the creditor's
mortgage.78 On occasion, a judgment creditor can garnish70 or attach
personalty0 before the debtor has rights in it recognized by the Code; 81
if the debtor has no rights in the property, his secured idreditor can have
none under an after-acquired property clause.8 2 In Pennsylvania, for
example, when two or more execution writs of separate plaintiffs are
levied on a garnishee, priority is determined by the date of geiviee of
the original writ as to all property then in the hands of the garnishee or
coming into his possession up to the time of judgment against the gar-
78. Sometimes the secured creditor's inadvertence permits the judicial lienor to obtain
priority. If, for instance, by the terms of the agreement the security holder has an interest
in only the after-acquired accounts of the debtor, such an interest could not perfect until
the debtor's executory contracts had ripened into a present right to payment. U.C.C,
§ 9-106. A judgment creditor, on the other hand, may sometimes garnish or attach these
contract rights earlier, when the debtor's rights are still only executory. P. Coogan,
Intangibles as Collateral under the Uniform Commercial Code, 77 HAtv. L. REv. 997, 1014
(1966).
79. In Connecticut a creditor may garnish any debt, legacy or distributive share that
is or may become due to such defendant from the estate of a deceased person or insolvent
debtor by garnishing the executor, administrator or trustee of such estate. CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 381 (1958). Depending on when a court determines such interests
become definite enough to be termed the debtor's property, thereby allowing the security
interest also to attach, it is possible that the judgment creditor may be able to establish
a lien prior in time to that of the Article 9 interests. Section 9-204, for instance, is silent
as to how contingent an inheritance right may be and still be termed the debtor's
property.
80. In Pennsylvania the right to attach a debtor's property before final judgment is
limited. If the defendant is a nonresident with property in the hands of others within
the state, the plaintiff may garnish such property within the state at the initiation of the
suit. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, R. 1252 (R. Civ. Proc. (1966 Supp.)). Attachment upon initia.
tion of suit may also be obtained under the Fraudulent Debtor's Attachment Act when
the debtor threatens to hide or otherwise protect his personal property from subsequent
seizure by plaintiff pursuant to an execution writ following judgment. PA. STAT. ANN,
tit. 12, R. 1286 (R. Civ. Proc. (1966 Supp.)). Both Rules are rather narrowly interpreted to
limit their availability, e.g., Greenwald v. Marvin, 31 Pa. D. & C.2d 748, 752 (1963), (R.
1252 interpreted narrowly).
In aid of execution of judgment, tangible personal property in the hands of a third
party and intangible personal property and rents of the judgment debtor can be levied
on by executing a writ on the garnishee. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, R. 3108 (R. Civ. Proc.
(1966 Supp.)). Attachment when authorized is treated similarly to garnishment under a
writ of execution, except that at the time of attachment the party garnished must possess
some property of the debtor's. This is not required before a writ of execution may be
served. Once the garnishment is valid, the lien is good against all personal property which
may come into his possession until judgment is entered against him. See PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, R. 3111(b) (R. Civ. Proc. (1966 Supp.)). Compare Sniderman v. Nerone, 136 Pa.
Super. 381, 384, 7 A.2d 496, 498 (1939), aff'd, 336 Pa. 305, 9 A2d 335 (1939); Pennsylvania
Co. v. Youngerman, 314 Pa. 277, 282, 171 A. 594, 596 (1934); Frazier v. Berg, 806 Pa. 317,
325 (1932).
81. The Code seems never to have contemplated the fact that a debtor might have no
"rights in the collateral" insofar as a judgment lienor is involved, but not insofar as a
secured creditor is concerned. U.C.C. § 9-204, Comments I & 2; § 9-301, Comments 1.3. But
the uncontemplated is a distinct possibility. See notes 72-73 and p. 1664 supra.
82. U.C.C. § 9-204: "1) A security interest cannot attach until ... the debtor has rights
in the collateral ...."
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nishee.83 The date of the original service might be found equally opera-
tive when the judgment creditor competes with an Article 9 security
interest. If so, then the judgment creditor would always have priority
with respect to property the garnishee acquires subsequent to the ser-
vice of process.
This interpretation of Pennsylvania law is not inevitable. Special laws
applicable to intramural conflicts between two liens of the same type
may not be controlling for liens that are governed by different statutes
which allow one lien to be created before the other. Preference in such
cases might be based on the more general rule that until the debtor
acquires an interest in property creditors can acquire none.
If a Pennsylvania court should adopt the more general rule as to
when a judicial lien attaches, then a judgment lien could be considered
to attach at the same moment an Article 9 security interest is perfected.
A court faced with simultaneous attachment and perfection could fol-
low Pennsylvania common law that provides for a pro rata distribution
of the collateral.8 4 Since the possibility of such simultaneous attachment
results from Article 9 security holders encountering interests out-
side the scope of the Code, there would be no reason for the Pennsyl-
vania court not to go outside the Code for the solution to the problem
as well. While this would be a novel approach, it would avoid an all-or-
nothing solution when it is difficult to think of a persuasive reason to
award the whole collateral to one creditor alone.65 It would also com-
port with the principle of apportionment, which the Code approves
with respect to accessions and commingled assets.
Yet another alternative, suggested in Rosenberg v. Rudnick,80 would
be to award preference to a security interest if filed before service of the
writ of execution; if filed subsequent to the writ the lien would be sub-
ordinate. This priority scheme would parallel that established by the
83. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, R. 3137(b) (F_ Civ. Proc. (1966 Supp.)); Sniderman v.
Nerone, 136 Pa. Super. 381,7 A.2d 496 (1939).
84. Claason's Appeal, 22 Pa. 359 (1853); Hendrickson's Appeal, 24 Pa. 363 (1855).
85. We must first face the fact that priority rules under most systems of law are
complex, and, to a considerable extent, arbitrary. Perhaps a better word is "technical."
One cannot assume that a rule governing a large body of commercial practices will
always favor the "good" man even where it is possible to determine who te good man
is. Although the application of a priority rule in a particular situation usually has a
basis in common sense, the priority rules of the Code are in many wais as arbitrary as
the rule in a bridge game that says that an ace takes priority over a king.
Coogan & Gordon, The Effect of the Uniform Commercial Code Upon Receivables Financ-
ing-Some Answers and Some Unresolved Problems, 76 HAv. L. REv. 1529, 1563 (1963).
86. 262 F. Supp. 635 (D. Mass. 1967). The court reasons that while an after-acquired
property mortgage is not fully perfected until the debtor acquires rights in the collateral.
it can be partially perfected immediately upon filing. When filed, the mortgage is
perfected against judicial lienors, but not buyers in the ordinary course of busines3 and
purchase money security interests. Id. at 638.
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Code for two after-acquired property mortgages where both have been
filed.8 7 But while this priority rule allows two after-acquired property
interests to compete on equal terms, it would, if extended to the context
of a secured creditor competing with a judgment lienor, favor the after-
acquired property creditor over the judicial lienor. The former could
file his lien at any time after he agreed to extend credit, whereas the
latter could obtain one lien only after the debtor had defaulted.
But if a court must adopt a priority scheme that will on rare occasions
handicap one creditor and favor another, perhaps it is the secured
creditor who should be prejudiced. If he finds himself disadvantaged,
he can always reduce his claim to judgment and obtain a judicial lien"5
-the lien creditor has no converse option.
87. U.C.C. § 9-312(5).
88. Section 9-501(1): "When a debtor is in default under a security agreement, a secured
party ... may reduce his claim to judgment or otherwise enforce the security interest by
any available judicial procedure."
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